Lynda Lea Tracy and Donna Tracy King v. University of Utah Hospital, Does I Through X Ada Hannah Tracy, Deceased, By and Through Sharon Tracy Voight, Natural Daughter and Next Friend, and Sharon Tracy Voigt : Brief of Respondent University of Utah Hospital by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Lynda Lea Tracy and Donna Tracy King v.
University of Utah Hospital, Does I Through X Ada
Hannah Tracy, Deceased, By and Through Sharon
Tracy Voight, Natural Daughter and Next Friend,
and Sharon Tracy Voigt : Brief of Respondent
University of Utah Hospital
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU; Attorney for Defendents-Respondent;SHARON
TRACY VOIGT; Pro se; D. KENDALL PERKINS; Attorney for Plaintiffs;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Tracy & King v. University Hospital, No. 16784 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1998
1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA LEA TRACY and 
DONNA TRACY KING, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
HOSPITAL, DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants-Respondent Case No. 16784 
ADA HANNAH TRACY, Deceased, 
by and through Sharon Tracy 
Voight, natural daughter and 
next friend, and SHARON 
TRACY VOIGT, 
Applicants for 
Intervention-Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge 
SHARON TRACY VOIGT 
P. O. Box 874 
Cathedral City, CA 92234 
Applicant for Intervention-
Appel lant, 
pro se 
D. KENDALL PERKINS 
12 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
Kim R. Wilson 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondent 
MAR28 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA LEA TRACY and 
DONNA TRACY KING, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
HOSPITAL, DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants-Respondent Case No. 16784 
ADA HANNAH TRACY, Deceased, 
by and through Sharon Tracy 
Voight, natural daughter and 
next friend, and SHARON 
TRACY VOIGT, 
Applicants for 
Intervention-Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Honorable Horner F. Wilkinson, Judge 
SHARON TRACY VOIGT 
P. O. Box 874 
Cathedral City, CA 92234 
Applicant for Intervention-
Appel lant, 
pro se 
D. KENDALL PERKINS 
12 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
Kim R. Wilson 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE. . . . • • • . . . • . . . • . . . . . • . • . • . 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT......................... 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . . 2 
ARGUMENT. • • • • • . • . . . • • . • . . . • . • • . • . . • . • . . . • • • • • • • • . • • 4 
POINT I: JUDGE WINDER'S ORDER DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S SECOND MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS A FINAL 
APPEALABLE ORDER FROM WHICH NO APPEAL WAS 
TAKEN AND WHICH BARS APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO 
INTERVENE. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
TO CONSIDER AND DETERMINE THE MERITS OF 
APPELLANT'S SECOND MOTION TO INTERVENE WHILE 
THE ORDER ON APPELLANT'S FIRST MOTION TO 
INTERVENE WAS ON APPEAL BEFORE THIS COURT. 
POINT III: APPELLANT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM 
RECOVERY OF HER SHARE OF SUCH DAMAGES AS 
MAY ULTIMATELY BE AWARDED. 
SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Page 
Commercial Block Realty Company v. 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 
2 8 p • 2 d 1 Q 81 t 8 3 u t ah 4 14 ( 1 9 3 4 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 5 
Drury v. Lunceford, 
415 P.2d 662, 14 Utah 2974 (1966) ................. 9 
Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 
228 P. 557, 64 Utah 125 (1924) .................... 10 
Tripp v. District Court of Third 
Judicial District, 
56 P.2d 1355, 89 Utah 8 (1936) .................... 5 
Veazey v. City of Durham, 
57 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 1950) ......................... 7, 8 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
12 AM. JUR. Appeal and Error, 
Section 357 .......................... · .. · · · · · · · · · · 6 
RULES CITED 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 41 (b) ........... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Rule 7 2 (a) •........... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
5 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA LEA TRACY and 
DONNA TRACY KING, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
HOSPITAL, DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants-respondent 
ADA HANNAH TRACY, Deceased, 
by and through Sharon Tracy 
Voight, natural daughter and 
next friend, and SHARON 
TRACY VOIGHT, 
Applicants for 
Intervention-appellant. 
Case No. 16784 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit by plaintiffs, Lynda Lea Tracy and Donna 
Tracy King to recover for the wrongful death of their mother 
arising out of her treatment at the University of Utah Hospital. 
Applicants for Intervention and Appellant are the decedent and 
a third daughter, Sharon Tracy Voigt. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant's third motion to intervene was heard on 
November 16, 1979 by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District 
Judge. The motion was denied on the ground that a prior motion 
to intervene had been granted with prejudice and that the 
granting of the third motion was barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the order denying Appellant•s 
motion to intervene. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the statement of facts in Appellant's brief is 
incomplete, Respondent will here set forth facts it believes 
are material to this appeal. 
On or about May 15, 1975, Ada Hannah Tracy died while a 
patient at the University of Utah Hospital. She was survived 
by three daughters including Lynda Lea Tracy, Donna Tracy King 
and Appellant. 
On or about January 20, 1977, Lynda Lea Tracy and Donna 
Tracy King instituted an action against the University of Utah 
Hospital in the District Court of Salt Lake County seeking 
damages for the wrongful death of Ada Hannah Tracy. 
On or about November 10, 1977, Sharon Tracy, sometimes 
known in these proceedings as Sharon Tracy Voigt, appearing 
pro se, filed a motion on behalf of herself and Ada Hannah 
2 
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Tracy, her deceased mother, to intervene in the pending action 
initially brought by her sisters. 
The motion to intervene was argued before the Honorable 
David K. Winder, District Judge, on February 14, 1978. At the 
conclusion of the hearing Judge Winder denied the motion to 
intervene without prejudice (R. 64). 
Appellant took an appeal to this Court from Judge Winder's 
order (R. 64). On or about May 25, 1978, Respondent filed a 
motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the denial of a 
motion to intervene without prejudice was not a final order 
within the meaning of Rule 72 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This Court agreed and on June 7, 1978, granted the motion to 
dismiss the appeal (R. 177-178). 
During the time this Court was considerir. the appeal from 
Judge Winder's order denying intervention, Appellant filed a 
second motion to intervene along with other motions (R. 122-123). 
A hearing was held thereon on April 10, 1978, before Judge 
Winder. At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Winder entered 
his order dated April 12, 1978, denying Appellant's second 
motion to intervene (R. 130-131). 
Appellant attempted to file a notice of appeal from the 
April 12, 1978 order but failed and refused to pay the filing 
fees required by law after notice that the appeal would not be 
accepted without the fees. A copy of Judge Winder's letter to 
Appellant on May 3, 1978, relating to the filing of the appeal 
3 
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is at R. 153-154. The notice of appeal was never filed from 
Judge Winder's order of April 12, 1978, denying the second 
motion to intervene. 
On or about March 1, 1979, Appellant filed her third 
motion to intervene in the pending action (R. 339-340). A 
hearing was held thereon on November 16, 1979, before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge. Judge Wilkinson 
entered his order on November 30, 1979, (R. 408-409) denying 
Appellant's third motion to intervene on the ground that Judge 
Winder's order of April 12, 1978, (R. 130-131) denied the same 
motion with prejudice and was a valid, binding order which 
barred the granting of the third motion to intervene under the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE WINDER'S ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S SECOND 
MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER 
FROM WHICH NO APPEAL WAS TAKEN AND WHICH BARS 
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO INTERVENE. 
Rules 72 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures provides 
in material part as follows: 
An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from 
all final orders and judgments, in accordance 
with these rules: provided, that when other claims 
remain to be determined in the proceedings, a party 
may preserve his right to appeal on the decided 
issue until a final determination of the other 
claims by filing with the trial court and serving 
on the adverse parties within the time permitted 
in Rule 73 (a), a notice of his intention to do so. 
4 
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The above rule provides that either a notice of appeal 
or a notice of intent to appeal must be filed within one month 
from the entry of an appealable order. 
Orders which finally adjudicate a person's status in a 
suit or controversy are by definition final orders from which 
appeal can be taken. Judge Winder's second order finally 
adjudicated Appellant's right to intervene in the suit in 
that it was not granted "without prejudice". See Rule 41 (b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In Utah the denial of a 
motion to intervene with prejudice is an appealable order. 
In Conunercial Block Realty Company v. United States 
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. 28 P.2d 1081, 83 Utah 414 (1934), 
this Court said: 
We believe that the better reasoned decisions are 
to the effect that where it is a proper case for 
intervention a judgment denying the right to inter-
vene is appealable. At 1082. 
This Court again affirmed that an order refusing to permit 
intervention is appealable in Tripp v. District Court of Third 
Judicial District, 56 P.2d 1355, 89 Utah 8 (1936). 
Since Judge Winder's order of April 12, 1978, denying 
Appellant the right to intervene was an appealable order, an 
appeal or notice of intent to appeal was required to have been 
filed within one month of the entry of the order. Appellant 
failed to do so even in the face of precise instructions from 
5 
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the Court, and the order must now stand as the final adjudi-
cation, on the merits, on her rights to intervene in the 
pending litigation. 
Judge Winder's order of April 12, 1978, is~ judicata 
and bars the granting of a subsequent motion to intervene 
made on behalf of the same parties and for the same reasons. 
Therefore, Judge Wilkinson's order of November 30, 1979, 
denying Appellant's third motion to intervene was proper and 
made without error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER AND 
DETERMINE THE MERITS OF APPELLANT'S SECOND MOTION 
TO INTERVENE WHILE THE ORDER ON APPELLANT'S FIRST 
MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS ON APPEAL BEFORE THIS 
COURT 
Appellant contends that the lower court lacked jurisdic-
tion to hear and consider her second motion to intervene 
during the time the denial of her first motion to intervene 
was on appeal to this Court. 
It is the general rule that an appeal of a final order, 
when duly perfected, divests the trial court of jurisdiction 
of the cause and transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court. 
However, this rule does not apply in the case of a nonappealable 
interlocutory order. 
12 AM. JUR. Appeal and Error §357 states: 
A litigant cannot deprive the trial court of juris-
diction by taking an appeal from a nonappealable 
interlocutory order, and even an appeal from an 
appealable intermediate or interlocutory order does 
not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to pro-
ceed in matters not involved in the appeal. 
6 
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In Veazey v. City of Durham, 57 SE 2d 377 (N.C. 1950), the 
defendant asked the trial court to order a compulsory refer-
ence of the case. When the trial court declined to enter such 
an order, the defendant appealed to the North Carolina Supreme 
Court. The trial court retained jurisdiction over the cause 
and tried the matter on its merits during the time its prior 
order was on appeal to the Supreme Court. At some time follow-
ing trial on the merits, the Supreme Court considered and dis-
missed the appeal on the ground that the order was not an appeal-
able order and was thus not subject to review. 
The defendant appealed a second time contending that the 
trial court had no jurisdiction to undertake further proceed-
ings on the cause while the Judge's first order was on appeal. 
In its opinion the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the 
issue that is now before this Court on this appeal. 
[W]e are presently concerned with this precise 
question: What is the effect of an appeal from 
a nonappealable interlocutory order upon pro-
ceedings in the Superior Court pending the dis-
missal of an appeal by the Supreme Court? ... 
" •.. [A] litigant cannot deprive the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction to try and determine a 
case on its merits by taking an appeal to the 
Supreme Court from a nonappealable interlocutory 
order of the Superior Court. A contrary dec-
ision would necessarily require an acceptance of 
the paradoxical paralogism ~h~t a p~rty to.an . 
action can paralyze the admini~tration of.Justice 
in the Superior Court by the simple ex~edient 
of doing what the law does not allow h~m t~ do, 
i.e. taking an appeal from an order which is not 
appealable. 
7 
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Our conclusion on this aspect of the contro-
versy finds full sanction in previous decisions 
of this Court adjudging that when an appeal is 
taken to the Supreme Court from an interlocu-
tory order of the Superior Court which is not 
subject to appeal, the Superior Court need not 
stay proceedings, but may disregard the appeal 
and proceed to try the action while the appeal 
on the interlocutory matter is in Supreme Court. 
(Citing cases) Moreover, this conclusion is 
sustained by the repeated cases holding by 
implication rather than by express declar-
ation that an appeal to the Supreme Court 
from a nonappealable order of the Superior 
Court confers no power on the Supreme Court 
to decide the appeal and that the Supreme Court 
must dismiss the appeal because it cannot pro-
perly exercise a jurisdiction which it does not 
possess. 57 SE 2d 377 at 382, 383. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that it had 
no jurisdiction to hear the nonappealable order. Therefore, 
the trial court was not divested of jurisdiction in the 
matter. Thus, the orders and judgments of the trial court 
during the pending appeal of the nonappealable order were 
rendered within the full jurisdiction of the court and were 
binding on the parties. 
Here Appellant appealed Judge Winder's first order denying 
her right to intervene without prejudice. The order was found 
by this Court to be nonappealable, and the appeal was summarily 
dismissed. Under the teachings of Veazey v. City of Durham 
the trial court retained jurisdiction over the matter for all 
purposes. 
While the first nonappealable order was pending in this 
8 
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Court, Appellant sought to take advantage of the continuing 
jurisdiction of the trial court and filed various other motions 
including a second motion seeking to intervene in the pending 
action. The trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction, 
and considered and ruled upon the motion. Judge Winder's 
order of April 12, 1978, (R. 130-131) denied Appellant's 
motion to intervene with prejudice. No appeal was taken from 
it and it, therefore, became final. 
Appellant has raised the issue that her second motion to 
intervene was but a motion to reconsider. It should be noted 
that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make no provision for 
such a motion. Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P2d 662, 14 Utah 2974 
(1966). There can be no mistake that Appellant's second motion 
was a separately filed motion and that it sought leave for 
Appellant to intervene in the pending suit. Thus, Appellant's 
contention is without merit and has no effect on the validity 
of Judge Winder's order denying the motion. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERY OF HER 
SHARE OF SUCH DAMAGES AS MAY ULTIMATELY BE 
AWARDED. 
Judge Wilkinson's order of November 30, 1979, contains 
a provision which preserves to Appellant her rightful share 
of any recovery for wrongful death which may be made in the 
pending litigation. That portion of the order reads as follows: 
Lynda Lea Tracy and Donna Tracy King a~e entitled 
to prosecute this action for the benefit of all 
heirs of Ada Hannah Tracy, deceased, and the pro-. 
ceeds of any settlement or judgment rendered herein 
9 
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shall be held by the present Plaintiffs for the 
use and benefit of said heirs, including Tracy 
Voigt, in accordance with their lawful claim upon 
said proceeds. 
Judge Wilkinson's otder is wholly consistent with Utah 
law. In Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 228 P. 557, 
64 Utah 125 (1924), the Supreme Court held that there was 
only one cause of action for wrongful death in the State of 
f. 4 
. . 
Utah and that if an action for wrongful death is prosecuted 
by less than all of the heirs of the decedent, they prose-
cute it for the benefit of all heirs. This Court said: 
Nor is the omitted heir, if there be one, without 
a remedy. If damages are recovered, each heir is 
entitled to his proportionate share, whether he 
was a party to the action or not, and, if his 
share is withheld from him, he may always sustain 
an action against his co-heirs for contribution. 
At 562. 
Therefore, Appellant will not be prejudiced by denial 
of her motion to intervene. 
SUMMARY 
Judge Wilkinson did not err in denying Appellant's third 
motion to intervene. The issue had been finally adjudicated 
in a prior hearing before Judge Winder who had jurisdiction 
to hear and to enter the dismissal order from which no appeal 
was taken. Judge Wilkinson properly denied the third motion 
to intervene under the doctrine of res judicata. 
Further, Judge Wilkinson's order preserves the right of 
recovery of Appellant, and she, therefore, is not prejudiced 
10 
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by the ruling of the Court. 
The Judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2<:./ day of March, 1980. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By : -i....:""~-------------,,.~-­p Merlin R. Lybbert 
11 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
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herein; that she served the attached Brief of Respondent 
(Case No. 16784) upon the parties listed below by placing two 
true and correct copies thereof in an envelope addressed ·to: 
Sharon Tracy Voigt 
P. o. Box 874 
Cathedral City, CA 92234 
Applicant for Intervention-
Appellant 
pro se 
D. Kendall Perkins 
12 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for plaintiffs 
and mailing the same, postage prepaid, on the 
March, 1980. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
March, 1980. 
day of 
---
day of 
---
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
